Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

JAPANESE

Q&As

REPORTER: Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) has held a press conference earlier in which it stated that although it had previously reported that it had suspended the injection of seawater on March 12 on one occasion, it is now saying that it actually did not suspend the injection of seawater. When did the Government receive a report about these facts and what will the Government's response be, considering that it turns out that the report that injection of seawater was restarted at 8:20pm was mistaken?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I received a report about this matter after 2:00pm and before 3:00pm today. Setting aside the fact whether seawater was actually continuously injected, I believe that unless TEPCO understands the facts accurately and then reports them to us, this will affect our response and more than anything it will cause doubts and distrust to arise among the public. I repeat what I have said before that they must report accurate information based on an understanding of the actual facts and also report immediately if any new facts emerge. I will be conveying this message to TEPCO through the offices of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA).

REPORTER: The Government has stated up to now that it has been in contact with not only the head office of TEPCO, but also in direct communication with people on the frontlines of the operation. On this occasion it would seem that the head of operations at the power station did not comply with instructions from head office and did not suspend the injection of seawater. In dealings with the head of operations at the power station to date, did he ever provide an explanation to the Government that the injection of seawater had been temporarily suspended?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: Communications between head of operations Mr. Yoshida and the Prime Minister's office are held as necessary and I am not aware of the entire situation. As for myself, and also Minister Kaieda and the Prime Minister, we only became aware that there had been an initial injection of seawater that had supposedly subsequently been suspended a considerable time after the event itself. In specific terms, I recall that from the end of April to the beginning of May, given that there was a possibility that questions may be asked in the Diet concerning the chronology of events, I read a memo that detailed various events in chronological order, not just limited to the current issue, and believed that memo to show the timeline of events. I believe that the Prime Minister's Office and also Minister Kaieda also received such a timeline of events and came to know the facts in the same manner.

REPORTER: Why have you not been aware of the actual facts of the matter until now?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I am aware that the memo that I first saw at the end of April or the beginning of May from which I gained information about the timeline of events was based on a report that had been received by NISA from TEPCO. If there had been some exceptional reason to doubt the content I may have asked for further details, but as this memo was based on a report from TEPCO stating that this is what had happened, I accepted it as fact. As to why such a mistake occurred at TEPCO, I will be enquiring about this in greater detail through NISA.

REPORTER: Do you think that the head office of TEPCO was trying to cover-up details of the information available at the power station?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: That is exactly why we need to find out why a report was provided to the Government via NISA stating that at shortly after 7:00pm the injection of seawater was started and then suspended, when in actual fact it was not suspended. The Government intends to inquire with TEPCO through NISA as to why if, as it has now emerged, the injection of seawater was not temporarily suspended, why this situation was not understood at an early stage in the operations. This is something that I believe is not something that would normally need to be covered up and therefore as I stated this morning there are many points about this case and others that we must reflect on, concerning the status of information collection and communication. I believe that at the very least there are many lessons to be learned from this case.

REPORTER: According to the press conference by TEPCO the timeline of events was compiled from a memo at TEPCO head office, without confirming the facts with Mr. Yoshida at the power station. Have instructions been given to reassess and correct the details of this case, and does the Government intend to directly question Mr. Yoshida about the circumstances?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I think that it can be generally said that this case shows that it is necessary to confirm the facts of reports received to date, and contact people who are in a position to know the facts, regardless of whether they are located on the ground at the power station or at TEPCO head office. For matters that have already been reported and other matters the Government will be requesting that efforts be made to ensure that facts and the background to various matters can be thoroughly confirmed.

REPORTER: And what about Mr. Yoshida? Will you be speaking with him?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: At the moment Mr. Yoshida is making every effort to bring the situation at the power station under control with a great sense of urgency. Once the Nuclear Incident Investigation and Verification Committee is launched, I think that it will be of course the case that Mr. Yoshida will be questioned and the Committee will duly investigate and verify the background and facts relating to this matter. Before that however, we will be asking TEPCO to confirm the facts themselves first, after which it will also provide a response to the Investigation Committee. Mr. Yoshida is responsible for on-site efforts to bring the accident under control and I think therefore that it is important to thoroughly confirm the facts of the matter, without imposing too much of a burden on him.

REPORTER: For the report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) I believe that Special Advisor Hosono will be leading a Government inquiry. If this is the case will Mr. Hosono not be inquiring to Mr. Yoshida directly concerning the circumstances of this incident?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I am not directly aware of the details of this matter and I would like to confirm with the IAEA Ministerial Conference Report Compilation Team and Special Advisor Hosono about whether anyone has spoken directly to Mr. Yoshida to date.

REPORTER: In relation to the TEPCO press conference, although it turns out that the injection of seawater was in actual fact not suspended, a TEPCO employee who was dispatched to the Prime Minister's Office at around 7:25pm has stated that there was an atmosphere in the Prime Minister's Office that seemed to suggest a decision on the injection of seawater could not be made. This official has also stated that TEPCO head office and the power station agreed to temporarily suspend the injection of seawater. What is the background to this comment that the atmosphere at the Prime Minister's Office suggested that a decision could not be made?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: It was known from an early stage that it would be necessary to inject freshwater and start cooling the reactors from an early stage. Although it is generally the case that freshwater would be used for cooling purposes, with the absence of freshwater it was necessary to inject seawater to cool the reactors. This operation was something that had to be implemented with the utmost urgency and although I am not an expert on nuclear power and still do not have expert knowledge, the common premise shared by everyone was that water must be injected. Therefore, in the meeting that was held at 6:00pm - although I was not present at the time I have since received reports from those who were there - it was commonly recognized and understood that such an operation would have to be implemented as a matter of urgency. As to the intent of the comment by the TEPCO representative who was also present at this meeting, to be honest I am completely baffled why he would have such a different understanding of the situation at the time.

REPORTER: I would like to confirm this. If what you have said is true, then is it the case that while the Cabinet Office was repeatedly calling for sea water to be injected as soon as possible, it was already being continually injected at Fukushima?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: According to the records - especially those available to me - senior staff of the Prime Minister's Office had been speaking about water injection with TEPCO and NISA since the time between the evening of March 11 and early hours of March 12, the time that later became the focus of examination as to when the venting operation took place. We were insisting that water must be injected in some way, whether seawater or otherwise, with comments like "we must inject water soon", "why are we not injecting water," and "should we not inject water soon?" being reiterated at the same time as venting. The fact that water had to be injected in at an early stage was repeatedly stated as well by the specialists and other involved parties. I think that the question of whether or not we were saying this during the time when water was being injected, that is, the time specifically from 7:00pm onward is not strictly clear. However, it is clear at least that at the time of the meeting at 6:00pm, it was consistently said that if the fresh water is unavailable, then in the absence of fresh water we would possibly have to use seawater, and that it should be done soon. That said, in a report we received from TEPCO, it was stated that it would take about one and a half hours for preparation. With that, we began discussing the fact that it was advisable to inject water soon.

REPORTER: Do you acknowledge that the perception gap was caused purely by the time-delay in the transmission of information?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I feel that we can only imagine now. Already in the early stages after the incident occurred, it was agreed by various parties, including the TEPCO staff and NISA specialists in the Prime Minister's Office, that we should by all means inject water, and then release air through a venting operation. For that purpose, electricity had to be brought from somewhere, or alternatively, a power source was needed. Regarding these three points, above all else, we reiterated the need to hurry, and to question why we could not proceed; this is our common understanding. That is what I thought, at least, when I was there at the time. I feel somewhat uneasy about the fact that some people are saying that this was not necessarily the case, and wonder if there may have been a gap in understanding.

REPORTER: Just now, you said that "we must ask why TEPCO made a mistake of this kind." At the time of the report at around 3:00pm today, did they only report that there was no fact that the water injection operation was interrupted, without explanation as to why such a mistake had been made?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: When they checked and held a hearing with the on-site chief, Mr. Yoshida, he reported that "the instruction to stop was given, but the operation was not stopped due to the judgement at our side." This was found yesterday, so there was a report that the previous report would be corrected quickly.

REPORTER: It may have been determined yesterday, but in the end, it was announced today. Was there some kind of explanation regarding this time lag?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: There was no report about this; however, it is not like the time directly after the earthquake struck, when the circumstances were changing from one minute to the next. In such a situation, I would expect that they pass on information as quickly as possible, by the very minute. Nevertheless, based on the results of the hearing, reports were issued to the Prime Minister's Office as well as NISA immediately the following day, and announcements were made in press conferences as well. Under the current situation, I think that information was reported promptly and without concealing.

REPORTER: It seems that the credibility of the other facts announced already by TEPCO has been damaged again, both at home and abroad. As a result, regarding the re-confirmation of which you spoke earlier, are there plans for the Government to do something binding, based on legislation of some kind, to instruct or order such explanations?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: If it was intentionally reported incorrectly, or intentionally omitted, then I think such a response may be necessary. However, assessing the situation from the reports being received at present, I feel the cause could instead be the fact that it was announced with no effort to share information or communicate thoroughly, and without confirmation. I think that, as I made clear earlier, what is important in terms of checking whether there are factual mistakes, would be for a related party, who understands the relevant facts, to confirm as much as they can, in practical terms, whether or not there are any discrepancies in understanding or inconsistencies.

REPORTER: Regarding the question of whether or not this was intentional, in the TEPCO press conference earlier, when asked what exactly the initial announcement that "there was an interruption at 8:20pm" was based upon, they said that Mr. Yoshida gave such a response to the head office, based on which they made that announcement on May 22. If this is true, then it seems that the initial announcement must have occurred because there was a false report within TEPCO. Nevertheless, do you think that there was no suspicion of intentional concealment or cover-up of information...

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: At least, in regard to the facts that TEPCO has been announcing all along, I think it was not intentional on the side of the sections responsible for public relations and information gathering; rather this was due to inadequate confirmation with the chief of the local staff and a lack of communication. In that sense, my opinion is that things would not have turned out this way if clear confirmation had been made with all those involved. Of course, in the future, when conducting investigations and so on, elements like those you pointed out today should probably be kept in mind, as needed, for TEPCO.

REPORTER: Changing the subject, in a speech at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) the Prime Minister voiced that Japan was to construct 10 million solar panels. How will the Government plan to advance these efforts in the future?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: When making considerations on the future of overall energy solution in Japan, we came to the conclusion that solar energy would be a very powerful and realistic tool. Solar energy has already begun to spread to a certain extent due to policies that have been formulated. Nevertheless, I think that we should present the concrete steps necessary for further accelerating this spread while we consider these ambitious targets and as we conduct a thorough investigation on the problems and inadequacies of past policies.

REPORTER: On an unrelated matter, this afternoon President Koji Ishida of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group was presented to the Diet as a new member of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) Policy Board. He will be taking the place of Mr. Tadao Noda from Mizuho Financial Group, making him the second consecutive board member from the financial community. Please comment on what qualities were considered to make President Ishida suitable for this position when making the decision to appoint him.

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: As you have pointed out, Koji Ishida was for many years the president of Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and he also has experience as a standing auditor and in other positions. Moreover, he is now the president of Sumitomo Mitsui Finance & Leasing Co. I understand that he is praised as an individual who is very knowledgeable about the financial economies. It is important that the BOJ Policy Board members are from various backgrounds, and that they conduct deliberations in those capacities and with a high level of expertise. We decided that Mr. Ishida was suited for the post due to his firm understanding of financial operations in private sector financial institutions and the high praise he receives for his advanced knowledge, management skill, and many other qualities.

REPORTER: On a related note, concerning appointment proposals for Diet approval, a similar proposal was presented for members of the Reemployment Surveillance Commission. However, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in power, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) disapproved of the Reemployment Surveillance Commission members three times in a row, and, in fact, this commission was even put into a dormant state. Now that the DPJ is in power, what are the implications of the DPJ proposing Commission members?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: The reason that the DPJ opposed the National Personnel Authority when it was not in power was that the commission at that time had the authority to make outplacement possible for current staff as an exception to reemployment regulations. The commission served as a sort of "golden parachute" outplacement approval committee. I am completely against the idea of "golden parachute" outplacement, and that is why I could not agree with that framework, and thus opposed it. However, I think that this authority was granted as an interim measure until the end of 2009, and after that "golden parachute" outplacement was totally prohibited and is not in the authority of this commission. Nevertheless, we had intended to launch a new powerful body for monitoring reemployment, and we paid consideration to this idea. In fact, in April of this year we decided on an overall picture for reforms to be carried out under the Basic Act on Reform of National Public Officers' Systems. The new commission based on this reform, the Reemployment Monitoring and Adjustment Commission, is to be established in FY2012 in the earliest case. Since the problems that I just mentioned no longer exist, it was decided that until the new commission is established, it would be appropriate to begin to assess and utilize the monitoring function of the current commission for dealing with the "golden parachute" problem.

REPORTER: The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (JTUC), or RENGO, which contains the labor unions that promote nuclear power stations, has decided to freeze its policy of promotion of nuclear power stations for the time being. How does the Government take this decision? Also, what are the Government's current thoughts on reflecting the decision into national policy in the future?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I am aware that this was reported in the evening edition of the newspaper. However, I have yet to hear specifically what RENGO decided and what the context for that decision was. RENGO is one of advocacy groups the DPJ and we will use the views of such organizations as reference; however, these views do not sway the policies of the Government. Nevertheless, I think that we must listen to and reference the views of federations with people that work across a broad range of industries, when it comes to problems like this one that garner strong interest from national citizens.

REPORTER: This question is in relation to the Prime Minister's speech to OECD, which you addressed earlier. What kind of discussion was held within the Government before the Prime Minister made his speech on realizing a 20% ratio of natural energy sources by the early 2020s? The Prime Minister previously mentioned that he would scratch, or revise, Japan's Basic Energy Plan. However, there are no visible signs that the Government made deliberations on a concrete policy, making it seem as if the Prime Minister just abruptly came up with this policy. What was the process behind the formation of this policy?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: Regarding critical issues that the Prime Minister appeals to the world, there are of course times when so-called "accumulated discussion" is necessary; however, it is also important that the Prime Minister shows robust leadership by changing policy direction and pushing decisions forward on particularly major issues, instead of accumulating discussion. This new direction was crafted under the leadership of the Prime Minister based on this idea. That is how I understand it.

REPORTER: Please comment on the reasoning and aim behind the selection of the Chair of the Reemployment Surveillance Commission.

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I believe that he was a lawyer working in the private sector before. Since the Chair will be involved in the personnel affairs of civil servants, it is best if the Chair has as little direct connection with the public sector as possible. Moreover, the Chair will be observing certain due processes and in some instances must assess the facts of various situations. So, in that respect it would be favorable to have someone with legal experience. However, we honestly had a very hard time searching for a lawyer with such experience that we could ask to do this - the individual would indeed suffer a big decrease in income as he or she would become a fulltime Government employee. So we needed to find a person with befitting and appropriate experience who would agree to the likely significant decrease in their income that results from taking on a fulltime Government position instead of working as a lawyer. He accepted the position as it plays an important role for the National Government and society, and that is how we selected him.