23 April 1997 09:38-09:52 (Tokyo time)

Press Conference Room at the Official Residence of the Prime Minister

It seems that, fortunately, the Japanese hostages suffered only minor injuries. There have been reports of bruises, burns, sprained ankles and broken heels, but there do not seem to be any injuries to be concerned about. All have been freed without harm. However, among the Peruvian hostages, Supreme Court Justice Carlos Giusti Acuna died and two members of the Special Forces were killed in battle. My heart grieves for those who died, especially for the Special Force members who gave their lives in this operation.

Foreign Minister Ikeda will take off from Tokyo or Narita at around 20:00 this evening and head for Lima.

I spoke with President Fujimori for 15 or 20 minutes this morning beginning at 8:55 a.m. I thanked the president, and when I asked him about his family members and the family members of Peruvian Ambassador to Japan Aritomi, the president responded that all were well. He said, however, that one Supreme Court Justice and two Special Force members were killed.

The president was extremely gracious as he explained that the extremely subtle timing of the operation did not allow for prior contact and asked for my understanding in that regard. I responded that had I been in his position, I might have done the same, and although I did tell him that it was regrettable that he was not able to inform me ahead of time, I also told him that I fully understood.

In our conversation, President Fujimori asked me to convey a message to the people of Japan in which he said that although it took time, he had been able to free the hostages without giving in to terrorism. He understood that so many people in Japan had been worried, and he thanked the people of Japan for the trust that they had placed in him and the Government of Peru.

For my part, I informed the president that I would be sending Foreign Minister Ikeda today firstly to thank him personally and at the same time, to resume Embassy operations, now that the incident has been resolved. Furthermore, I told the president that Foreign Minister Ikeda would handle any problems which may arise concerning the corporations related to the released hostages and that he would not bother him there. Also, now that the Ambassador's Residence has been liberated, we naturally want to make a thorough investigation and I ask for the president's cooperation in that regard.

The president said that if acceptable, he would like to close off the Ambassador's Residence for two days. He explained that he wanted that time in order to clear away any explosives and land mines which the terrorist group may have left and to ensure the safety of the facility.

Fortunately, there are already members of the National Police Agency on site in Lima. I explained that I would like them to be consulted before the Residence is closed off. Otherwise, the possibility exists that unnecessary problems may arise in the future.

At the same time, I explained that Foreign Minister Ikeda would be bringing with him specialists from the National Police Agency who will handle the investigation and I asked for cooperation from Peru in the investigation of the Residence. We were in full agreement on this matter.

As we speak, a replacement medical team is on its way and will arrive in Lima this afternoon. This team includes internal and gastrointestinal experts and radiologists, and I will also dispatch other specialists who will immediately conduct general examinations and deal with any problems arising from post-traumatic stress disorder or other psychological effects of the long-term confinement which the hostages endured. There are academic psychology experts who have been of great help to us so far and I intend to send some of them along with the team to Lima.

During the past few months since this incident began, you, the media, have been seeking information while we, in the interest of the hostages' safety, have wanted not to disclose information, and from time to time, there have been some frustrations among you all. Today, now that the incident has been brought to an end, I would like to apologize once again and express my thanks to those who have cooperated so conscientiously during this incident. That is all I have to say.

Q. Was there any more detailed explanation from President Fujimori on the choice of timing for his decision to go ahead with this rescue operation?

Prime Minister Hashimoto: Even if there were, it is still too sensitive and I would rather not say. I would rather refrain from disclosing whether or not there was.

Q. At the meeting in Toronto, you and the president agreed that in principle, the incident would be solved peacefully, but that this would not be the case if the safety of the hostages was in question. In light of that agreement, do you condone the actions that were taken this time?

Prime Minister Hashimoto: It is easy to talk about theory. However, it is only the Commander-in-Chief on site who can make a decision about whether or not a specific opportunity to effect a rescue should be taken. Fortunately, that decision, although it did result in some sacrifices, was successful. Whether or not that amounts to a broken promise is not something I think about.
Rather, I would say that President Fujimori as the Commander-in-Chief made the best decision on timing. As a result, it is true that one hostage died and two members of the Special Forces Unit were killed. But the others were all rescued without serious harm. Doesn't that answer all your questions?

Q. Recently, there has been very little information coming to us on the situation in Peru and I have been watching the situation with great concern. I wonder if the government conducted internal considerations and made simulations on an eventual forced storming of the Residence, and whether or not the government had predicted this timing?

Prime Minister Hashimoto: At least when I am in Tokyo, if this kind of situation occurs, there might be prior notification, or there might be cases in which an urgent decision is needed and no prior notification is made. In the event that I were to go abroad, the biggest problem would be what to do if such a situation occurred while I was in the air, and depending on whether I am in any foreign country or still in the airspace, the scenario would be different. However, it is impossible that we should ignore such a possibility. Only an optimist would ignore such a situation.
Moreover, of course there was a difference between the situation when I traveled to the ASEAN countries in January and the situation today after the Toronto meeting. It should be quite natural for the government to consider how it would respond to the various scenarios of being in Tokyo and receiving prior notification or not receiving notification and being abroad and receiving prior notification or not receiving notification.

Q. Tomorrow you are scheduled to travel to the United States. Will you change your schedule in order to meet with President Fujimori?

Prime Minister Hashimoto: First of all, that would be quite rude to other countries. At the same time, I do not believe that this is the kind of visit that could be made as an add-on to the visit to another country. That is precisely why I've asked our Foreign Minister to fly off immediately and take the necessary measures. When I can find the time, the destination will be Lima and the return destination will be Tokyo, perhaps with a stop along the way to refuel. That's the kind of trip that this situation requires. I don't think that this is the kind of thing that can be dealt with by my simply dropping by Peru along the way home from another trip.